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Abstract	  
The Iron Triangle formulates the holy trinity of objectives of project management – 
cost, schedule, and benefits. As our previous research has shown, ICT projects deviate 
from their initial cost estimate by more than 10% in 8 out of 10 cases. Academic research 
has argued that Optimism Bias and Black Swan Blindness cause forecasts to fall short of 
actual costs. Firstly, optimism bias has been linked to effects of deception and delusion, 
which is caused by taking the inside-view and ignoring distributional information when 
making decisions. Secondly, we argued before that Black Swan Blindness makes decision-
makers ignore outlying events even if decisions and judgements are based on the outside 
view. Using a sample of 1,471 ICT projects with a total value of USD 241 billion – we an-
swer the question: Can we show the different effects of Normal Performance, Delusion, 
and Deception?  
We calculated the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of (𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 − 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡) 𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑠𝑡. Our results show that the CDF changes at two tipping points 
– the first one transforms an exponential function into a Gaussian bell curve. The second 
tipping point transforms the bell curve into a power law distribution with the power of 2.  
We argue that these results show that project performance up to the first tipping point 
is politically motivated and project performance above the second tipping point indicates 
that project managers and decision-makers are fooled by random outliers, because they are 
blind to thick tails. We then show that Black Swan ICT projects are a significant source of 
uncertainty to an organisation and that management needs to be aware of. 
Finally, we draw implications about the underlying generative processes that lead to 
power law behaviour, which might help to further understand the pitfalls and shortcomings 
of cost and cost risk management in ICT projects.  
  
Double Whammy – How ICT Projects are Fooled by Randomness and Screwed by Poli tical Intent 
 Alexander Budzier, Bent Flyvbjerg 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Marx referred to technology as 'frozen labour' - work and its values embedded and in-
scribed in transportable form... where they [technology] are used to make decisions, or to 
represent decision-making processes, such technologies also act to embed those decisions. 
That is, the arguments, decisions, uncertainties, and processural nature of decision-making 
are hidden away inside a piece of technology or in a complex representation. Thus values, 
opinions, and rhetoric are frozen into codes, electronic thresholds and computer applica-
tions. Extending Marx, then, we can say that in many ways, software is frozen organisa-
tional discourse.” (Bowker & Star 1994:187) 
 
 
“For the past 40 years, for example, we’ve tortured ourselves over our inability to finish 
a software project on time and on budget. But as I hinted earlier, this never should have 
been the supreme goal. The more important goal is transformation, creating software that 
changes the world or that transforms a company or how it does business. We’ve been ra-
ther successful at transformation, often while operating outside our control envelope. 
Software development is and always will be somewhat experimental. The actual software 
construction isn’t necessarily experimental, but its conception is. And this is where our fo-
cus ought to be. It’s where our focus always ought to have been.” (DeMarco 1995:95) 
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A	  Tale	  of	  Two	  Projects	  
In May 1996 the decision-makers at the Benefits Agency of the UK Department of So-
cial Security and the executives at Post Office Counters Ltd. jointly made a decision. They 
awarded a one billion GBP, seven year contract to Pathway, a subsidiary of Fujitsu. Their 
decision would finally teleport the paper-based benefits payment process into the 21st cen-
tury by January 1999. This decision was a major transformation, it would change how 
20,000 post offices would work, and it would change how 17 million benefits recipients 
would receive their money, a number that sums up to about 760 million payments every 
year. However, the decision quickly turned sour - in July the first issues were discovered 
two month before the system development was planned to start, by the end of the year the 
project was re-baselined to allow increase the time for system development from seven to 
twelve months. In the end the project was abandoned in May 1999, software development 
was not finished and the most current forecast projected the project to deliver three years 
behind scheduled go-live, 30% budget overrun and a total spend of 1 billion pounds (Na-
tional Audit Office 2008).  
The private sector does not fare better in comparison. In 2003 the Levi Strauss Compa-
ny celebrated its 150 birthday. Apart from the company’s birthday the management was 
facing two highly critical issues. First, international expansion to over 110 countries had 
lead to a highly fragmented and overlapping IT architecture. The company operated a Baan 
system in Europe and ran a mix of bespoke mainframe solutions for Asia, Canada, and the 
US. Secondly, the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act put pressure on auditors and financial process-
es. A new auditor revealed flaws in accounting procedures, which almost forced Levi 
Strauss to restate their accounts. Presented with a burning platform the top-management 
decided to revamp the complete architecture. The project aimed to implement SAP with 
the help of Deloitte consulting. Analysts estimated the project cost to be USD 5 million 
without consulting fees. Project complexity increased quickly: while the project was being 
first implemented in Asia, Levi-Strauss’ key client Walmart required that the existing - and 
soon to be replaced - systems interface with their supply chain management system. In 
2008 the system was finally rolled out to the U.S. market. Project management anticipated 
risks during switch-over. The company pre-shipped as many Q2 orders in Q1 as possible. 
However, when the actual go-live happened the three US distribution centres went offline 
for a full week. As a result Levi Strauss reported a USD 192.5 million hit to the bottom line 
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for Q2. David Bergen, who had been Levi’s CIO for 8 years, resigned from his post. SAP 
still remains the key vendor to Levi Strauss (ZDNet, SAP, The Register, ITPro).  
The Benefits Cards Payments project and Levi Strauss’ ERP debacle clearly raise the 
question: Are these two tales archetypical for the performance of ICT projects or are they 
one-of-a-kind bad apples? 
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How	  Risky	  are	  ICT	  Projects	  Really?	  
Several attempts have been made to turn the anecdotal evidence of cost and schedule 
overruns and benefits shortfalls in large-scale ICT projects into surveys that measure risk 
more systematically.  
When the Standish Group first published the now infamous Chaos Report in 1999 their 
findings reflected the perceived high risk of ICT projects. Similarly the Function Point Es-
timation work done by Jones (Jones 1998) reported a plummeting success rate of ICT pro-
jects with increasing size. Both studies saw virtually no success for projects larger than 6 
million dollars.  
However, academia contested these findings on the grounds that sampling was skewed 
towards failure, data collection was opaque, and the categorisation of success, challenged, 
failed projects was methodologically biased (Eveleens & Verhoef 2010; Keil 1995, Keil & 
Mann 1997, Keil, Mann & Rai 2000b; Jorgensen & Molokken-Osvold 2006, Molokken-
Osvold & Jorgensen 2003; Sauer et al. 2007; Zhang, Keil, Rai & Mann 2003).  
But then how risky are ICT projects really? Three approaches can be found in the exist-
ing literature (1) studies of the effectiveness of software cost/scope/schedule estimation 
techniques; (2) surveys of software professionals, and (3) analyses of ICT project portfoli-
os. Table 2 gives an overview of these studies, while the following discusses key contribu-
tions.  
The first approach to measure the risks associated with ICT projects is anchored in the 
field of software development metrics. Jones' (1998, 2003) work on function points re-
presents the longest academic record of these types of analyses. While the dataset itself on-
ly measures schedule risk (average of -8%) it gives an indication of the failure and success 
rate. Jones reports a success rate of 14% (Jones 2008) and 18% (Jones 1998) and a cancella-
tion rate of 13%, 24%, 29% for 2000, 2007, and 2008 respectively. While Jones’ work was 
fundamental for establishing metrics of software quality and productivity the data do not 
reflect overall project performances. Firstly, because patterns of productivity, quality and 
scope creep de-stabilise above a scope of 10,000 function points (approx. 30 months of 
project duration). Secondly, the methods cover software development explicitly, incidental 
efforts such as overtime, documentation, project management, and change to business 
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processes constitute up to 75% and estimates for the same project differ for up to 100% 
depending on which of the 10 available function point methods is used as estimator (Jones 
2008). Moløkken & Jørgensen (2003; 2006) conducted a meta-analysis of 10 software esti-
mation surveys published between 1984 and 2002. These 10 studies reported cost overruns 
between 33-34% and 22% schedule overrun. Budget and schedule overruns occurred in 6-7 
out of 10 projects, under-runs in 1 out of 10.  
A second approach to measure the ICT project risk is surveys of project professionals. 
Keil et al. (Keil, Tan, Wei, Saarinen, Tuunainen & Wassenaar 2000a; Keil & Flatto 1999; 
Keil 1995; Montealegre & Keil 2000; Keil & Mann 1997a; Zhang, Keil, Rai & Mann 2003) 
surveyed IS auditors and asked how many of the last projects, they were involved with, es-
calated and by how much. The survey found that 30-40% of all projects escalated on aver-
age by 21 months, median 15 months. Non-escalated projects delivered on average 18% 
over budget, and 22% behind schedule; whilst escalated projects come in 156% over budg-
et and 133% behind schedule. Sauer et al. (Sauer et al. 2007; Sauer & Cuthbertson 2004) 
surveyed 412 project managers about their current or most recent projects. The survey re-
ported that a reasonable expectation of risk is 7% cost, schedule overrun and scope short-
fall in 2 out of 3 projects. Studying ICT project performance with survey-based methods 
introduces the considerable memory bias of which two aspects are particularly problematic 
(1) consistency/desirability bias and (2) recency effects. Firstly, most of these studies have 
been framed in the context of the inflated Standish Figures (Anon 1999), which were most-
ly perceived as unjustly distorting the real performance of ICT project managers (Glass 
2006). Thus motivating the subjects to lean towards a more positive view of project per-
formance. Secondly, the human memory biases, over-emphasises recent experiences and 
critical events (Chell 2004) over of the average performance, a bias that would motivate 
respondents to underreport project performance.  
A third approach to quantify ICT project risk has been pursued by Verhoef and his re-
search group who first used the Jones (Jones 1998) data to model risk quantitatively 
(Verhoef 2002). In two studies (Eveleens & Verhoef 2009; Kulk et al. 2009), the group ana-
lysed the ICT project portfolio of two organisations that consisted of 1,172 projects, the 
project size was on average 581,000 EUR. The first study reported 286% average cost 
overruns for organisation 1 (n=867 projects), median cost under-run of 38%. For the se-
cond organisation (n=140 projects) cost overruns were 16% on average, the median cost 
under-run was 2%. The functionality delivered was only measured in organisation 2 where 
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projects over-delivered by 10% on average, median 0% (Eveleens & Verhoef 2009). These 
two studies reported largely skewed cost overrun data with half the portfolio coming in 
under budget and a much larger average than median. The data indicates that the majority 
of projects stays within the budget but the considerable right-tail skew typically results 
from right-tail outliers. The second study (Kulk et al. 2009) looked at one additional organ-
isation with 165 projects in total with an average project budget of 2.2 million EUR. The 
average cost overrun is about 0%, they argued that a good estimate should forecast a budg-
et that is [-5%, 2.5%] around the actual cost. Furthermore the two studies found that the 
five organisations showed unique pattern of accuracy, biases, and patterns of convergence 
of forecasts to actual figures (Eveleens & Verhoef 2009; Kulk et al. 2009). These studies 
addressed the previous issues of selective reporting and respondent biases effectively. 
However, as the authors pointed out sampling from a limited number of firms and the re-
sulting very different patters for the each of the five organisation make cross comparison 
impossible either due to organisational, industry or geographic differences. Moreover the 
studies did not check for confounding effects, such as project size or duration. Table 1 
gives an overview of previous studies of ICT project risk. 
However, when looking at the demand or buying side of the ICT project a whole differ-
ent picture emerges. In a non-academic survey CFOs were asked about their ICT project 
performance. The survey reports that only 35% of all finance ICT projects delivered on 
budget, with 27% running <15% over budget; 16% of the projects between 15-50% over 
budget and another 16% with more than 50% budget overrun. Only 7% of the projects 
delivered on time, 25% of the project showed slight delays, 68% of the projects showed 
major delays (Friedman & van Decker 2010).  
In sum the academic studies have not found support for alarmist statistics. Even though 
the scale is more than an order of magnitude smaller deviations from the initially planned 
forecasts have been observed. Which raises the question what are the root causes of the 
risk? 
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Black	  Swan	  Blindness	  as	  a	  new	  cause	  of	  ICT	  project	  risk 
The notion of risk in ICT projects is typically rooted in a normative-positivist concep-
tion that implies that all risks are manageable (Stahl et al. 2006). The most commonly used 
definition of ICT risk is McFarlan's (1981:143): “...exposure to such consequences as: fail-
ure to obtain all, or even any, of the anticipated benefits; costs of implementation that vast-
ly exceed planned levels; time for implementation that is much greater than expected” 
McFarlan's definition mirrors the iron triangle of cost-schedule-benefits as the key perfor-
mance dimensions of projects, the author follows the notion that other commonly used 
outcome variables such as scope, user satisfaction, should ultimately contribute to the or-
ganisation's bottom-line. A second often cited definition of risk is “Expo-
sure=Probability*Loss” (Boehm 1991:147). The causes for risks clearly lie in our incom-
plete knowledge of the subject matter, thus if a project establishes all possible causes of 
risks they can be managed away. Fortune & White (2006) used a meta-analysis of more 
than a decade of research to compile a ‘complete’ list of risk factors. In total the authors 
distilled 27 critical success factors for ICT projects (Fortune & White 2006).  
An alternative school of thought acknowledges more clearly the social construction of 
ICT project risks. A turning point in software engineering was the discovery that ICT pro-
jects are 'Peopleware' (DeMarco & Lister 1999), sometimes also explained within the 
phrase “ICT systems are social systems” (Crewe & Young 2002:13). The same acknowl-
edgement of ICT systems being social systems is made for instance by Mumford (1995), 
and earliest by Brooks (1975), who pointed out the detrimental effects of adding program-
mers to a delayed projects and the impact of overhead and incidental activities on the 
productivity of programmers. The acknowledgement of the social side of projects puts risk 
management into the social sciences. Who look for the causes of risks into individual and 
group processes, e.g. escalation of commitment (Staw & Ross 1989), groupthink (Janis 
1971), or principal-agent behaviour (Demski & Feltham, 1978). 
A third school of thought is based on the foundational work of Behavioural Economics. 
Kahneman & Tversky (1977) asked: “What factors limit intuitive judgements and how to 
correct them?” The authors found that errors of judgement are systematic. Experts and 
laypeople make similar errors because they neglect distributional data and take an internal 
approach. Moreover, they found that intuitive predictions are typically non-regressive. 
Thus expert estimates are usually overconfident in the absence of distributional and condi-
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tional data. Lastly, judgement and decision-making from experience is usually limited to the 
'normal' condition and heavily influenced by anchoring, e.g., by plans and recent experienc-
es (Kahneman & Tversky 1977). In sum, behavioural economics argues that intuitive 
judgements are systematically biased towards optimism and overconfidence. However, in a 
review of 15 studies on the performance of expert estimates vs. model estimates Jørgensen 
(2004) finds no conclusive evidence for either method. Moreover, he argues, the results 
indicate that expert estimates in software development are better performing than expert 
estimates in other professions. Jørgensen explains his findings with the high volatility of 
ICT projects, which prefers context-rich expert estimates over formulaic models, and the 
poor performance of formal estimation methods compared to estimation methods in other 
professions, due to low correlations between schedule, cost, and effort.  
Organisational behaviour analysis found that managerial optimism biases are based on 
the illusion of control (March & Shapira 1987). Illusion of control is described as the “ex-
pectancy of a personal success probability inappropriately higher than the objective proba-
bility would warrant” (Langer 1975:311). The illusion of control is ubiquitously institution-
alised through cybernetic control systems, e.g. accounting, budgeting, KPI performance 
measurements, Balanced Score Cards (Dermer & Lucas 1986). On an individual managerial 
level these delusions have not only been explained by the illusion of control but also by the 
escalation of commitment (Staw 1981, Keil & Mann 1997, Drummond 1999) and the self- 
and organisational desirability of a course of action (Heaton 2002; Staw 1981; Budescu & 
Bruderman 1995; Klein & Helweg-Larsen 2002).  
 
Based on their earlier work, Kahneman & Lovallo (1993) re-visit the inside view to un-
pack the concept of uniqueness and its relation to decision-making. Their conceptual ar-
gument was that isolation errors stem from perceived uniqueness: forecasts are over-
optimistic because they are anchored on plans and scenarios of success, while singular deci-
sions neglect the option to pool risks and thus tend to be overly timid. Thus, Kahneman & 
Lovallo (1993) argue that taking the inside view to approach managerial problems is anoth-
er explanation (on top of the illusion of control) of managerial optimism. Flyvbjerg et al. 
(2002; 2005; 2007) further argue that not only managerial delusions of success are the bases 
of optimism bias but also strategic deception (Flyvbjerg et al. 2002). In the empirical work 
on construction projects the authors found a relatively constant level of cost overruns, 
which they link conceptually to an interaction effect of deception and delusion, whereby 
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delusion biases are gradually replaced by deceptive biases with increasing organisational and 
political pressures (Flyvbjerg, Bruzelius & Rothengatter 2006).  
 
This paper offers a new explanation of ICT project risk: “Black Swan Blindness”. Re-
cently the risk management literature starts referring to high impact, rare events as Black 
Swans - a term which has been coined by Taleb (2005; 2007). In the wider context of social 
studies of risk management Black Swans have been located within the wider field of un-
known-unknowns next to Wicked Problems and Post Normal Science (Elahi 2011). Ac-
cording to Elahi's interpretation of unknown-unknowns, Black Swans are characterised by 
their improbability of happening and the human tendency to post-rationalise their exist-
ence.  
Organisational behaviour studies show that decision-makers are Black Swan myopic. 
March & Shapira (1987) found that managerial decision-makers tend to ignore rare, low 
probability events and overestimate common events. March & Shapira argue based on two 
case studies that risk is not conceived as probabilistic with the possible impact being more 
salient than the likelihood of the risk happening. Furthermore they found that attitudes to-
wards risk are stronger determined by managerial factors (e.g., attention, illusion of control, 
reputation concerns) than systemic, organisational factors. Managers ignore rare events and 
overestimate common events because of a focus on short-term rewards for which known 
risks seem controllable. Most interestingly, March & Shapira find that in cases of success 
managers undertake elaborate strategies to inflate the perceived riskiness and play down the 
role of chance, implying that the rules of chance do not apply to them or that the rules can 
be changed (March & Shapira 1987). Their findings also raise a considerable concern to the 
ability of success case narratives, given that organisational informants are re-rationalising 
past decisions and report cases self-consistent (Lecky 1945).  
Dutton & Webster (1988) offer a different explanation for ignorance of risks: reduced 
importance. Their study found that high uncertainty, as embodied by Black Swans, reduces 
the importance of an issue for decision-makers. Both studies align with Elahi (2011) con-
ceptualisation of unknown-unknowns, which tend to be treated with ignorance in organisa-
tions because they are uncomfortable or even forbidden organisational knowledge (Stirling 
2010). However, Laughunn et al. (1980) observed that decision-makers do pay attention to 
potentially ruinous risks. 44% of their studied managers switched to a risk-averse behaviour 
when ruinous risks where introduced into experiments. Following the same argument of 
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potential ruin, Meszaros (1999) takes experimental findings into the wild and studies deci-
sion-making with potentially ruinous risks in six chemical firms in Philadelphia. The in-
formants recounted organisational histories of how firms re-assessed risks after the 1984 
Bhopal catastrophe. Meszaros constructs a nested survivability heuristic. The heuristic first 
asks the question whether a rare event is a threat to the survival of the company, followed 
by the question whether dealing with the risk appeals to upper management, and finally 
whether an adequate response to the risk is affordable to the company (Meszaros 1999).  
In sum, this paper argues that next to social processes that lead to optimism bias in 
form of deception and delusions, risks are underestimated if the risk distribution has fat 
tails, thus if the decision at hand turns out to be full of outliers, so called ‘Black Swan 
Events’. 
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Hypotheses	  of	  three	  regimes	  of	  project	  performance	  
The dispute of unacceptable cost overruns vs. acceptable risk could easily be discredited 
as a debate of experts vs. laymen, of anecdotal vs. systematic evidence — similar to the de-
bate about nuclear safety (Wynne, 1996). In contrast, this paper is going to propose a novel 
hypothesis: Both accounts of ICT project risk can be supported by data. We propose this 
first hypothesis behind our reasoning:  
⁃ H1: ICT project risk is a heavy tail distribution where outliers, i.e. out-of-
control Black Swan project, hide behind good average performance.  
This paper further argues that 
⁃ H2: Outlying ICT projects follow a different statistical regime than normal 
projects. 
⁃ H2a: ICT projects that come in under budget (left tail outliers) do so not be-
cause of performance achievements but because their budgets were cut. 
⁃ H2b: ICT projects that come in well over budget (right tail outliers) do so be-
cause they spun out-of-control and turned into Black Swans. 
Next this paper is going to discuss the data used for the study. Then we test H1 and H2, 
analysing the three regimes (1) normal Gaussian bell-curve performance, (2) politically in-
fluenced budget cuts, and (3) out-of-control cost overruns. Then the paper is sizing the 
impact of out-of-control projects and finally gives a short overview of causes of Black 
Swans. 
Double Whammy – How ICT Projects are Fooled by Randomness and Screwed by Poli tical Intent 
 Alexander Budzier, Bent Flyvbjerg 
15 
 
 
Project	  Archaeology	  
The data for our study was gathered in a guided project archaeology. The questionnaire 
design followed the methodology used in Flyvbjerg, Holm & Buhl (2002), Flyvbjerg, 
Skamris, Holm & Buhl (2005), and Flyvbjerg (2007) to collect project estimates for cost, 
schedule, and benefits along key decision-points in a project. We asked the participating 
organisations to provide data on the last 20-30 finished projects with as many data points 
on key decision within the project as possible. Participating organisations have been alerted 
to take utmost care in checking the figures provided against the original decision docu-
ments or the figures stored in their portfolio and project management or audit systems. In 
the worst case of organisational forgetting only the estimated costs and schedule at the 
green-light decision and the actual cost and schedule were available. We approached 
around 200 private sector organisations of which 20 participated, which results in a re-
sponse rate of 10%. In several cases organisations expressed interest and the data collection 
was started but yielded no results because no recorded information could be found. This 
archaeology resulted in a total sample of 142 ICT projects with rich data. 
 
At the same time we sampled from publicly available audit reports from the U.S. Gov-
ernment Accountability Office (GAO) and the U.K. National Audit Office (NAO). We 
were able to collect 149 large-scale ICT projects from the auditor's reports. 
 
The third data source we used was the United States Federal Budget Data. Each ICT 
project is required to file an E300 with the White House's Office of Management and 
Budget. We collected as many of those forms as possible across all 26 agencies and their 
134 bureaus within the United States federal government. Our efforts resulted in 13,166 
forms, of which 80% automatically scanned and 20% had to be entered by hand. This re-
sulted in a dataset of 5,137 projects. We regard projects as finished that have used at least 
90% of their budget when the report was filed, which yielded a total of 2,555 projects. To 
observe changes in forecasts we had to further narrow the project sample down to the mul-
ti-year projects, which resulted in a final sample of 1,180 projects.  
 
Thus in total our sample comprises 1,471 projects, which represents a total value of 
USD 241 billion (in 2010 USD), it is the largest academic dataset to date. The average pro-
ject size is USD 122.1m (plan) and USD 167.1m (actual) respectively. The median project 
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size is USD 3.3m (plan) and USD 5.8m (actual). Table 2 details the characteristics of the 
projects in our sample. Table 2 shows that our data spans not only software development 
projects but a broad array of project types; the table also shows that among the software 
implementation projects we find a broad range of ICT systems. Lastly, it shows that our 
sample substantially covers the decision years 2005-2010. 
 
Table 2 Description of Sample 
Project Type Frequency 
IT Integration 1% 
Standard Software 7% 
Bespoke Software 72% 
IT Infrastructure 8% 
IT Architecture 9% 
Other 12% 
System Type Frequency 
ERP 28% 
MIS 25% 
Office Systems, e.g. DCM 9% 
Disposition, e.g. CBS, SCM 12% 
Transaction 2% 
Other 24% 
Year of Green-Light Decision Frequency 
2004 and earlier 5% 
2005 11% 
2006 3% 
2007 12% 
2008 47% 
2009 12% 
2010 9% 
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ICT	  project	  risk	  distribution	  has	  fat	  tails	  
The first hypothesis postulated that ICT project risk is a fat, heavy tailed distribution. 
The table 3 lists the moments of the ICT project sample. 
 
Table 3 Risk distribution 
Distribution Moment Value 
Average cost risk 26.74 
Standard deviation 82.23 
Skewness 3.76 
Kurtosis 18.79 
 
While the average cost risk seems acceptable the standard deviation is comparatively 
large, indicating that in a normal distribution of this mean and standard deviation 95% of 
all observations would fall within (-100%, +188%). However the third and fourth order 
moment clearly show that this distribution is far from normality. 
Skewness is the third central moment and a measure of symmetry. The positive value of 
3.76 indicates a right skew in the distribution that is twice as large as the right-tail skew in 
the construction project sample. 
Kurtosis is the fourth order moment and a measure of centrality. Kurtosis of 0 indicates 
normal distribution. The higher positive kurtosis shows that the distribution is more clus-
tered around the centre of the distribution of ICT cost risks than in the distribution of 
construction cost risks. Thus the ICT risk distribution shows thinner tails but only until the 
outlier values, at which the details are much thicker than normality suggests. Thus skew-
ness and fat tails are more present in the distribution of cost risk in ICT than construction, 
which again is more skewed and has fatter tails than the normal distribution. 
 
We follow Taleb (2007) in our conceptualisation that Black Swans are high impact, rare 
events. Thus we expect Black Swans to translate into statistical outlier and extreme values. 
We tested whether outliers might be present. The existence of outliers has been noted be-
fore for instance in Kulk et al. (2009). While analysing sizeable ICT project portfolios the 
authors found a large number of outliers in their sample. However, and here differs our 
analytical approach, Kulk et al. (2009) excluded almost half their sample because of outly-
ingness in order to run their logistic regression analysis. In our analysis, however, we are 
particularly interested in these data points. 
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The	  statistical	  difference	  between	  mediocristan	  	  
and	  extremistan	  
Classical, Gaussian statistics developed and first rose to fame in demographics; a flavour 
of statistics employed to manage populations by enumerating them (Hacking 1991; Fou-
cault 2009). Demographics love the normal distribution - the idea that the average type is 
characterised by a measure of centrality, while conformity is measured in standard devia-
tions (Hart 2010). As Hart (2010) further argues the key assumption behind Gaussian sta-
tistics is randomness - taking a snapshot of a random sample. Even time series do nothing 
more than stitching a series of snapshots together. Random sampling philosophically and 
practically implies that everyone has an equal chance of ending up in the sample - a truly 
democratic, egalitarian, and atomistic premise (Hart 2010).  
 
Recently the attention of statisticians shifted from Gaussian statistics to Power laws. 
Power laws were initially discovered in geography describing city sizes (Auerbach 1913 and 
Zipf 1949) and first used in an economic setting to study the of wealth concentration (Pa-
reto 1964). Power laws have been established for a wide array of natural phenomena. 
Newman (2005) lists among others word frequency, citations of academic papers, visits to a 
website, or the magnitude of earthquakes. Power laws were introduced into organisational 
studies to explain the size distribution of business firms (Simon & Bonini 1958).  
 
Power Laws have two major implications for the understanding of risk in project man-
agement (1) exponential proportionality and (2) scale invariance. 
Firstly, power laws postulate that the probability of an event happening is exponentially 
proportional to its impact. Table 1 shows the odds of encountering a millionaire when liv-
ing in Europe a distribution that follows a quadratic power law. That means doubling the 
net worth reduces the odds to a quarter. To put it in other words — a millionaire that is 
twice as rich will occur four times more rarely (Hart 2010). 
 
Table 4 Power Law Example 
Net worth Probability 
>1 million 1/62.6 
>2 million 1/250 
>4 million 1/1,000 
 
Secondly, Power Laws are scale invariant. The relative probability to observe an event 
of a given size and an event ten times larger is independent of the reference scale 
(Bouchaud 2001). The scale invariance implies that the thickness of the tales does not 
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change with the impact of the event observed, in our sample the correlation between risk 
and cost overruns is only r = 0.093 with p < 0.001. 
Power Laws have the beauty of relying only on the singular parameter  . 
 
The constant   is called the exponent of the power law, whereas C is only introduced 
to the formula so that the CDF sums up 1 (Newman 2005). The higher moment m is de-
fined as 
 thus moments beyond the do not exist. With typical values of alpha 
being between 1 and 2 only the first moment µ is finite; second order moments and be-
yond (standard deviation, skewness, kurtosis) do not converge for power law distributions 
(Axtell 2006). 
 
Taleb (2007) argues that Power Laws are the best way to mathematically describe Black 
Swans. Black Swans have two key characteristics (a) they are high impact rare events, and 
(b) they can only be identified retrospectively not prospectively. High impact, rare events 
are the outcome of thick tails where outliers do not disappear behind a Gaussian average 
but show a very strong influence on outcomes. The ex-ante unpredictability follows from 
the fact that the typical Black Swan event will always be unknown, which is statistically tied 
to the non-convergence of the second, third, and fourth moment. Taleb paints the picture 
of two worlds: Extremistan and Mediocristan. Extremistan is the world of wild random-
ness, the world of Power Laws. Mediocristan, on the other hand, is the world of mild ran-
domness (Taleb 2007). Mild randomness allows Gaussian statistics to work because in this 
world outliers disappear in the averages of large samples (Mandelbrot & Taleb 2006). 
 
Testing	  Newtonian	  Laws	  vs.	  Power	  Laws	  
As suggested by (Newman 2005) we calculated the cumulative distribution function 
(CDF) instead of binning the frequencies to preserve as much distributional information as 
possible. We calculated the CDF in a way that P(x) equals the probability of a cost over-
runs equal or greater to x, i.e. the so called survival function 
 
Figure 1 shows the log-log plot of the CDF. Power laws express as straight linear func-
tions in log-log plots. The chart indicates a drastic change in the rate of change below and 
above actual/forecast = 100 (value of 2 on the log10 scale).  
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Figure 1 Log-Log Chart of the DCF 
 
 
 
The curve estimation needs to establish four parameters – (1) the slope of the left tail, 
(2) the mean of the performance regime, (3) the standard deviation of the performance re-
gime, and (4) the slope of the right tail. Furthermore the bounds of the three regimes need 
to be estimated. 
While an iterative EM algorithm is the best method to establish these parameters. This 
working paper used a first manual approximation to shows the three bounded regimes and 
estimate the four parameters. Table 5 gives the initial non-iterated results for the sample. 
 
Table 5 The Three Rgimes 
 Political Regime Performance Regime Black Swan Regime 
Lower Bound -100% -30% +48% 
Upper Bound -30% +48% +∞ 
Probability 6% 77% 17% 
Slope -0.001  -2.1 
Mean  103.58  
Std. dev.  14.79  
F  160.278  2274.264 
p (Fit) <0.01  <0.01 
R squared 0.92  0.98 
 
Table 5 shows the fitting results for the three regimes (1) political intent follows a power 
law, (2) managed performance follows a Gaussian distribution, and (3) Black Swans follow 
again a power law. 
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Political	  Intent	  in	  the	  Left	  Tail	  
Truth is not in numbers, as Hatherly, Leung & MacKenzie (2008) argued based on the 
observation of similar kinks in the distribution of reported profits in annual reports. The 
authors showed that accountants do not passively report the numbers they find but that 
accounting actively influences the numbers, which leaves visible traces in frequency distri-
butions.  
In this analysis the left tail follows a power law with a very low rate of change. A clear 
indication that this performance outcome is the result of a non-stochastic process. The fit 
is highly significant and fits 92% of the variance in the log-log plot. The probability of fall-
ing prey to budget cuts is relatively low but affects 6% of all projects. 
 
Managed	  performance	  around	  being	  on	  budget	  
The managed performance regime shows that normal projects have an average cost 
overrun of +3.6%, with a standard deviation of 14.8%. This regime has the highest proba-
bility of occurring a project stays within normal bounds of (-30%, +48%) with a 77% like-
lihood. 
 
Black	  Swans	  in	  the	  right	  tail	  
The right tail follows a very strong power law the slope is estimated to be -2.1 thus α = 
2.1. The existence of power laws in the right tail is an expression of an underlying probabil-
istic generator. The probability of becoming a Black Swan is estimated at 17% - a very high 
risk compared to thin-tailed distributions where outliers are happening with no more than 
0.7% probability on both ends of the tail. 
 
Black Swans are characterised as high impact events with wild randomness (Mandelbrot 
& Taleb 2006). The power law and the fat tails express the wild randomness. Table 3 
shows the impact of Black Swans. 
 
Table 6 Impact of Black Swans 
Risk All projects With cost overrun Black Swans 
Cost Risk +27% +70% +197% 
Schedule Risk +55% +60% +68% 
 
Firstly, the grand average of the total sample, which shows the average risk of project is 
27% in terms of budget, 55% in terms of schedule.  
 
Secondly, following the argument proposed by Yetton (personal conversation, May 
12th, 2010) that ICT projects cannot fully be managed like a financial investment portfolio 
because they are of strategic importance and usually not easily abandoned or divested from 
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(for an in-depth discussion of escalation of commitment see Keil et al., 2000 or Drum-
mond, 1999). Thus a portfolio of ICT projects is more impacted by downside risks of cost 
overruns and schedule slippage and there is only limited ability to profit from pooling risks 
and offsetting overruns with budget under-runs and earlier than expected implementations. 
The sub-sample of the projects with just the downside cost risk of > 0% contains 47% of 
projects of the total sample; the average cost overrun for this sample almost triples to 70%, 
schedule slippage increases slightly to 60%. 
 
Thirdly, for the Black Swans the average cost risks almost triples again to +197%, 
schedule risk slightly increases further to +68%. It is noteworthy that even though an aver-
age can be calculated from the empirical data the expectation value for the exponential dis-
tribution does not converge. Thus the expected Black Swan project does not exist statisti-
cally.  
 
The growing literature on power laws discusses five generating concepts (Mitzenmacher 
2004) that might advance the understanding of excessive cost overruns and risk manage-
ment practices in ICT projects – (1) Preferential Attachment, (2) Optimisation, (3) Propor-
tionate Effects, (4) Monkeys typing randomly, and (5) Double Pareto distributions. 
 
Firstly, preferential attachment describes the web graph, that is the link structure be-
tween web pages. The more popular a note is in terms of out-bound connections the more 
popular it tends to be in terms of in-bound connection. Similarly, (Simon 1955) pointed 
out the larger a city the greater its ability to attract more population. Preferential attach-
ment also explains book sales, website visits, and species distribution (Mitzenmacher 2004). 
In the context of ICT projects preferential attachment can be explained by the escalation 
of commitment (Keil, Mann & Rai 2000), i.e. the unwillingness to pull the plug of failing 
projects. If good money is thrown after bad money the preferential attachment leads to 
cost overruns that resemble power laws.  
 
Secondly, information theoretic optimisation leads to power laws (Mandelbrot 1952). 
Word frequency follows a power law if the langue is optimised for the average amount of 
information per unit transmission costs. Optimisation also explains power laws behind 
computer file sizes, the internet hardware infrastructure, and forest sizes (Mitzenmacher 
2004). ICT projects are per definition optimised investments. ICT projects aim to deliver 
an average amount of benefits at the lowest total project costs. Thus we should be able to 
observe that budget and benefit sizes, as well as cost and benefit risks distributions follow 
power laws.  
 
Thirdly, multiplicative processes create proportionate effects. Proportionate effects are 
also known as Gibrat’s law. Gibrat's law was the first formalisation of the winner-takes in 
market entry it has been describes as: “the probability that the next opportunity is taken up 
by any particular active firm is proportional to the current size of the firm” (John Sutton 
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1997, p.43). Proportionate effects have also been shown in income distributions, growth of 
sites on the web, and file sizes (Mitzenmacher 2004). In the context of ICT projects the 
concept of scope creep can be conceptualised by proportionate effects; the larger the scope 
of a project, the higher the number of change requests and thus scope creep. Similarly, re-
source scarcity in organisations creates ICT project portfolios that are highly skewed and 
follow power law distributions, very few megaprojects are surrounded by a plethora of 
small projects. 
 
Fourthly, in response to optimisation generators, random walks have been proposed as 
an alternative explanation. Word frequency distributions can solely be achieved by a ran-
dom walks, i.e. monkeys typing randomly (Mitzenmacher 2004). In terms of ICT project 
this explanation is the most dystopian and shows that perhaps none of the capabilities pro-
posed in many project management methodologies actually influences the outcome of the 
project, similar to the argument by Denrell (Jerker Denrell 2004, J. Denrell 2005).  
 
Fifthly, the combination of two random variables, so called double Pareto distributions, 
creates power laws in the upper tail (Mitzenmacher 2004). This class of generators has been 
proposed to account for age effects, i.e., describe the income distribution of a person while 
accounting for the person’s age (ibid.). For ICT projects (Barseghyan 2009) has shown that 
combining two random thin-tail processes for (1) the productivity of a developer and (2) 
the difficulty of the development task leads to a fat-tailed development duration distribu-
tion. 
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Conclusion	  —	  Double	  whammy	  indeed!	  
This paper finds that ICT project performance is fooled by complex, random stochastic 
processes, on one hand, and screwed by social and political constructed number games on 
the other hand. As Taleb (2001) sarcastically argued managers are fooled by randomness; 
i.e. a spotless track records of delivering one successful ICT projects after another should 
be attributed to the lucid fallacy or Black Swan Blindness instead of the superior abilities of 
the manager. Moreover, delivering a project significantly under budget is hardly an 
achievement, because the data indicates that in most cases the budget was taken away from 
the project.  
 
Our first statistical approximation of the collected sample has shown that on average 
ICT projects perform reasonably well — +27% cost overrun, +55% schedule overrun in 
three out of four projects. Apart from the risk of getting the budget cut a very high risk 
exists that a project turns into a Black Swan. One in six projects (17%) with cost overruns 
of nearly +200% and schedule slippage of nearly 70%. 
 
However, the high over-incidence of Black Swans underlines that ICT projects are a 
very important source of uncertainty in an organisation. The owner of a portfolio of ICT 
change initiatives needs to critically assess where the organisation stand when one in six 
projects develop into a Black Swan with 200% or more cost overruns and schedule delays 
of 70%. 
 
Lastly, one immediate application for the power law behaviour of cost overruns of ICT 
projects is the forecasting of failure. When it comes to managing the costs of an ICT pro-
ject Earned Value Management is currently considered best practice (Jeffrey & Leliveld 
2004) and has become a widely accepted standard (Project Management Institute 2008). 
Earned value methodology originally proposed a linear forecast of costs. That is actu-
al/plan performance is scaled linearly over the progress (Quentin Fleming 2005) later dif-
ferent methods (e.g., Monte Carlo simulations) have been proposed to generate S-curved 
or logistic forecasting models (e.g., Byung-Cheol Kim & Kenneth F. Reinschmidt 2010). 
However the discovery of power laws in the right tail of the cost risk distribution indicates 
that a more drastic approach is needed: if a project encounters a cost overrun of 20% at 
half time, the most reasonable estimate is not just twice the overrun, but rather the overrun 
to the power of 2.1 so not to expect 40% but 540% overrun at the end. 
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Limitations	  and	  future	  research	  
While the paper offers a novel contribution to analyse outliers as being the phenomena 
and not the noise, the findings have limitations. Firstly, since we relied on organisations 
that measured ICT project performance in terms of cost and schedule, and to a lesser ex-
tend also benefits; the sample might be biased towards a certain proficiency level of overall 
project management. Secondly, the proxy used to test the complexity is less then perfect 
and might need refinement. Project management scholars are currently developing percep-
tion-based scales to measure complexity (e.g. Whitty & Maylor 2009). Thirdly, the geo-
graphic focus might introduce cultural biases in the sample selection that prevent generali-
sability to Asian organisations.  
The findings show the importance of rare, high impact events when it comes to manag-
ing ICT projects and associated risks for organisations, portfolios, and investments. The 
findings are limited to a very first discovery of the existence of Black Swans in this particu-
lar reference class of risk and uncertainty.  
The paper points towards many open questions for future research. Among those are - 
What is the relation of Black Swans to project complexity? Which determinants change the 
probability of Black Swan Events? Which organisational processes can be linked to the 
theoretical underlying generators, e.g., preferential attachment?  
Remarks: This is a working paper and thus represents work in progress, we are currently 
further enlarging the sample size to 1,800 projects. We also work on improving the curve 
fitting and regime estimation by using an EM algorithm. 
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